Fireworks, Explosives, Guns, and Minors by Braun, George
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1966
Fireworks, Explosives, Guns, and Minors
George Braun
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Juvenile Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
George Braun, Fireworks, Explosives, Guns, and Minors, 15 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 566 (1966)
Fireworks, Explosives, Guns, and Minors
George Braun*
N MOST OF THE UNITED STATES the laws governing the sale
and use of fireworks, explosives and flammable decorations
follow the form of control regulations recommended by the Na-
tional Fire Prevention Association.' These severely restrict the
use of explosives and fireworks (with the exception of paper caps
for toy guns) to adults. Ohio has led the trend by imposing safe-
guards more restrictive than most states and, by recent statutes
together with decisions, imposing strict standards against manu-
facturers, sellers, keepers, users or other handlers of explosives
and fireworks in attempts to effectively control the hazards pre-
sented by these products. In Ohio, pyrotechnic displays may
be presented only by municipalities, or by authorized civic-
sponsored organizations engaging the services of experts accept-
able to the local fire control authorities, with sufficient bond to
cover injuries to person and property which might result and for
which they are held strictly liable. 2 Federal legislation was
passed in 1953 making it unlawful to ship fireworks into states
prohibiting their sale or use, thus assisting the program on a
national level. 3
The reason for tightening controls, and for prohibitions on
sale or furnishing possession or means of possession of fireworks
and explosives to minors is obvious upon examination of the
results of recent studies of fireworks casualty records conducted
by the National Fire Protection Association and published in
1965.4 Of 241 incidents occurring in June and July of 1964
resulting in the explosion of fireworks, in nine instances fatal
injuries were sustained and three hundred twenty-two casualties
required hospital care or treatment by physicians. Besides the
bodily injuries that occurred, ninety-five of these incidents
caused damage to property totalling over $1,000,000.00. Many of
the victims were innocent bystanders, the great majority being
minors. In fact, according to the statistics of the National Safety
*Of the Cleveland Bar.
1 By 1956, 30 states had adopted these regulations.
2 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 3743.33.
3 18 U. S. C. A. 836 (1954).
4 Accident Facts, p. 84 (1965 ed., published by National Safety Council).
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Council, 21% were nine years of age or less, 28% were four-
teen years of age or less, and 68% were under the age of
twenty-one. 5 The injuries ranged from cuts, bruises and con-
tusions of varying degrees of severity, to loss of limbs, eyesight
or hearing, and facial disfigurement, maiming and puncture
wounds.
Ordinary fireworks caused 88% of the incidents, while 6%
were involved in public displays and the remaining 6% resulted
from the use of homemade types.6
Statutory Controls of Fireworks, Explosives and Guns
In October 1963, Ohio increased its restrictions on the dis-
posal or giving of explosives to minors, which prohibits the sale
or giving of explosives to persons under 21.7 Moreover, no per-
son is permitted to sell fireworks of any kind to children under
the age of twelve.8 By Ohio statute an explosive is defined as
any chemical, compound or mechanical mixture intended to
produce an explosion or sudden generation of gaseous pressure
capable of producing damage to property, life or limb. Fire-
works is defined as any combustible substance or compound pre-
pared to produce a visible or audible effect upon ignition or deto-
nation. 10 A manufactured article exempt from the Ohio regu-
lations is defined to be a slow acting, extremely mild device,
such as a paper cap for toy guns, which is so constructed that
the hand cannot come in contact with the cap when it is in
place for the explosion." Thus, most pyrotechnical devices,
often referred to as "fireworks," would be considered explosives
under the Ohio test. No person shall sell, give or deliver an ex-
plosive to a person under twenty-one years of age in Ohio,
whether the person is acting for himself or anyone else. 12 (For-
merly the age limitation on explosives was sixteen.) No per-
son is permitted to sell at retail, possess for retail sale, discharge,
5 1964 Report, National Fire Protection Association.
6 Ibid.
7 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 3743.02 (eff. Oct. 14, 1963).
8 Ibid., Sec. 3743.37.
9 Id., Sec. 3743.01 (A).
10 Id., Sec. 3743.27 (A).
It Id., Sec. 3743.01 (B).
12 Id., Sec. 3743.02, as amended 1963.
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ignite, or explode, any fireworks except toy caps. 13 However,
by special permit of the fire chief of a municipality, fireworks
may be sold and used for public or private exhibitions, fairs,
carnivals and celebrations with the stipulation that the parties
sponsoring or conducting such exhibitions are held strictly liable
for damage to person or property. 14
The following popular types of devices would thereby seem
to fall in the category of explosives rather than fireworks in
Ohio:
Rockets: This consists of a tube packed with a powder
charge, one end being open and the other connected to a tail.
The powder charge burns progressively, driving the tube
ahead, the tail acting as a stabilizer. However, if the tail is
warped, the rocket may suddenly falter enroute and, in-
stead of shooting upwards, travel downwards or parallel to
the ground, causing severe burns to anyone caught in its path.
Roman Candle: These are repeating guns which shoot
projectiles of colored fire, emitting showers of brilliantly glow-
ing sparks between the shots. The components consist of a
mixture of sulfur, saltpeter with projectiles containing alumi-
num or zinc and an oxidizing agent. As the force of the ex-
ploding powder projects the projectile forward, the reacting
forces sometimes kick out the end of the candle. The stars are
similar in composition to thermit bombs used in warfare.
Torpedoes: These consist of a sackful of coarse sand and a
large cap. Upon striking a hard surface, the cap will explode
with the coarse sand striking, injuring or putting out the
eye.
Flash Crackers: These are considered a high-order ex-
plosive in that they go off very quickly, while ordinary fire-
crackers do not. The flash cracker contains a composition of
potassium chlorate and sugar and is extremely sensitive to
shock and heat and will explode violently at 1200 F.
Sparklers: This device is made by dipping an iron wire
into a mixture of potassium nitrate, sulfur and aluminum.
Its danger is that the wire, even after burning, may be hot
enough to start a fire.
Thus, under the definitions of the new Ohio law, the sale,
gift or delivery or other disposal of such items to any person
under 21 years of age are expressly prohibited. 15 The Revised
Code further declares it unlawful to discharge, ignite or ex-
13 Id., Sec. 3743.32; State v. DeWees, 6 Ohio St. 2d 153, 216 N. E. 2d 624
(1966).
14 Id., Sec. 3743.33.
15 Id., Sec. 3743.02.
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plode any fireworks, or to sell them at retail or even have pos-
session of them for such purpose. 16 Magazines or storage facilities
must be constructed so as to be able to contain their own blasts
and fire without igniting or discharging neighboring facilities.
17
All storage facilities must be marked by conspicious warning
signs, kept guarded and securely locked to all except au-
thorized persons.' s Blasting caps can only be sold or distributed
if their dangerous and explosive nature is legibly imprinted. 19
In Ohio every person engaged in any occupation involving
the sale, storage or use of any explosive (other than signalling
devices) is required to maintain records of entire inventory,
purchases, use, sale and disposal of explosives. Regular reports
are required, showing the quantity used, sold or otherwise dis-
posed of, with the name, address and intended use of the re-
cipient. The name and address and signature of every purchaser
or recipient must be secured, kept and made available to law
enforcement officials for one year following date of delivery. 20
Each loss of explosives by theft must be reported immediately,21
as well as every explosion or fire in excess of $500.00.22 Ob-
taining or attempting to obtain explosives by giving a false name,
address, age or purpose of purchase is unlawful.23 Exacting, reg-
ular inspections are imposed and violations of these laws are sub-
ject to punishment 24 and loss of license. 25 Furthermore, individ-
ual municipalities are permitted to impose their own restric-
tions on the use of fireworks or explosives, provided that they
are not less strict than the state laws. 26 Further protection to
minors is furnished by the Code which forbids the sale, exhibi-
tion for sale or furnishing to a minor under sixteen of a toy
pistol, air gun or any form of explosive gun. Any violator is
liable to any person damaged by such sale.2 7
16 Id., Sec. 3743.32.
17 Id., Sec. 3743.03.
Is Id., Sees. 3743.04, 3743.08, 3743.38.
19 Id., Sec. 3743.091.
20 Id., Sec. 3743.49 (A) & (B).
21 Id., Sec. 3743.49 (C).
22 Id., Sec. 3743.21.
23 Id., Sec. 3743.51.
24 Id., Secs. 3743.24, 3743.99.
25 Id., Sec. 3743.11.
26 Id., Sec. 3743.18.
27 Id., Secs. 2903.06, 1533.13.
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Civil Liability for Injuries to Minors By Explosives
The case law development of civil tort liability covers
numerous aspects which establish the legal consequences re-
sulting from injury to minors by explosives, fireworks, blasting
caps, flammable decorations, guns, pistols and ammunition. The
evidence must establish that the injurious material was an ex-
plosive, 2s unless the substance is such that the court will take
judicial notice of its nature.2 9
The decisions have not uniformly agreed whether con-
tributory negligence of a child will bar recovery, or3° whether
liability extends to injuries to third persons, or to injuries
caused by intervening or remote acts.
Duties to Children
While the broad rule in Ohio defines the duty of one oc-
cupying, possessing or controlling property to refrain from wil-
fully, wantonly or intentionally injuring a licensee or tres-
passer, exceptions have been made in cases of injuries to minors
by explosives. In the case of Vaughan v. Industrial Silica
Corp.3 1 the defendants were contractors engaged in blasting
in an abandoned quarry. They finished their work and lost
some blasting caps on the premises. The caps were found by
the plaintiff, a lad thirteen years and nine months old, who
was trespassing. He dropped a cap on a cement surface and
was severely injured by the resulting explosion. The evidence
disclosed that children frequented the quarry. The complaint
charged that the defendants negligently left a dangerous in-
strumentality on premises known to be frequented by children.
The defendants countered that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent, being of sufficient age and intelligence to appreciate
the danger of handling a dynamite cap. The court pronounced
the rule in Ohio to be that "one who keeps or uses explosives
owes a duty to young children who may have access to or come
in contact with them and who cannot be expected to know and
28 Ohio Bronze Powder Co. v. Allison, 7 Ohio L. Abs. 231 (1929).
29 22 Am. Jur., Explosions and Explosives, Secs. 3 & 93 (1939).
30 See 20 A. L. R. 2d 119 (1951) for complete discussion.
31 140 Ohio St. 17, 42 N.E. 2d 156 (1942). The judgment of the trial court
was subsequently reversed due to the fact that the court's charge had
placed a duty on the defendant higher than that defined.
Sept., 1966
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appreciate the danger incident thereto, to exercise care com-
mensurate with the danger in order to avoid injury to such
children." The decision was reversed and remanded because
the trial court charged that, if the defendants knew that
children trespassed, they owed a duty to see that they would
not come in contact with any explosives upon such land. The
degree of care was defined as ordinary care, which in the case
of dynamite caps was held to be "the use of utmost caution."
This language was found to make the defendants practically
the insurers of the safety of the plaintiff and the court stated,
"A correct definition of the quantum of care required would be
such as is commensurate with the danger involved.
3 2
Proximate Causation
It was held negligent for a railroad to leave unguarded
signal torpedoes, attractive to and easily picked up and handled
by children at places where children were permitted to travel.
In the case of Harriman v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co.3 3 a
nine year old boy picked up a torpedo which had been left on
the tracks in plain view at a point along the line where in-
habitants were daily accustomed to travel and pass over, with
the knowledge and acquiescence of defendant. The boy who
picked up the torpedo exhibited it to his companions including
the plaintiff, aged ten, and several other lads. It looked like
a harmless box, and neither the plaintiff nor the other boys
knew or believed it to be dangerous. The finder attempted to
open it and examine the contents. A violent explosion occurred,
killing one lad, blinding two others and severely wounding the
plaintiff. The defendant demurred to the plaintiff's petition on
several grounds, among which were:
1. That the defendant owed no duty or obligation to keep
its road safe to the plaintiff or his companions.
2. That the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury was the
lad who opened the box, not the defendant's servants.
The Supreme Court, in holding that the demurrer to the
petition should have been overruled, held that while the boy
who picked up the torpedo and opened it may have been a wrong-
doer, the defendant was negligent in leaving it exposed where
32 Id. at 22.
33 Harriman v. Pittsburgh C. & St. L. R. Co., 45 Ohio St. 11, 12 N.E. 451, 4
Am. St. Rep. 507 (1887).
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it might reasonably have been expected to be found and
handled. The fault of the finder and handler was not im-
puted to the plaintiff whose curiosity attracted him to his posi-
tion of peril. Nor was the claim that the causal connection be-
tween the injury and the negligent act, and the fact that it was
broken by the intervention of the boy who opened it, held to
affect the liability of the defendant.34 The act of finding and
handling this dangerous object was held to be the natural, an-
ticipated and probable consequence of the defendant's negli-
gence.3 5 This decision (and the companion Shields case36
which was brought on behalf of another lad who lost his eye in
the same accident) left unanswered the defendant's liability to
the trespassing child who picked up and opened the explosive.
The view of Ohio courts on this question was answered
in the case of Byrnes v. Hewsto7n" 7 where the ten year old plain-
tiff was injured by the explosion of blasting caps which he found
in a field next to a highway where the defendant contractor
had maintained a camp, and had done some blasting. The boy
took home the caps he found and, not knowing their danger-
ous character, put them on burning coals in a stove and was
severely burned in the resultant explosion. The contractor was
found liable even though it was not established that the aban-
doned camp site was frequented by children. The decision ap-
pears to hinge on the second paragraph of the syllabus of the
case which stated:
Ordinary care requires that dangerous instrumentalities
such as blasting caps should be cared for with the utmost
caution.
34 Ibid.
35 Id. This decision was subsequently distinguished based on the fact that
there was a regular flow of licensees passing over the railroad's premises
and the placing of a torpedo at a place which young children were known
to frequent, without any warning of its dangerous propensities, was wanton
negligence. Little or no reliance on this concept was imposed in Hannan,
Adm'r v. Ehrlich, 102 Ohio St. 176 (1921), where injury occurred in a rela-
tively inaccessible quarry rather than a regular public way across private
property.
36 Railway v. Shields, 47 Ohio St. 387, 24 N.E. 658 (1890). The court in
Haslem v. Jackson, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 348 (1941) applied the dangerous instru-
mentality concept in this case to a master's liability to a servant who is in-
jured by a dangerous instrumentality, and permitted a maid to recover for
injuries sustained when a fountain pen gas gun exploded as she was about
her normal duties.
37 13 Ohio App. 13, (motion to certify overruled) 31 Ohio App. (1920).
Which case relied on the reasoning in the Shield's decision (supra note 36)
regarding dangerous instrumentalities.
Sept., 1966
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No mention was made of the plaintiff's being a trespasser, or
his own act being a bar to recovery.
This duty prescribed in the Byrnes case was applied and
amplified in the case of Vaughan v. Wilkoff3 s which held that
one handling and disposing of explosives where children con-
gregate has a duty to use care to avoid injuring them by not
leaving the explosives in a conspicuous spot. In upholding this
duty to a fourteen year old boy, the court went further by im-
posing this duty upon the defendant irrespective of whether he
had possession or occupancy of the premises.39 The court again
did not bar recovery because the plaintiff was a trespasser or
licensee. In arriving at its decision the court quoted and ap-
proved American Jurisprudence" and its statement that:
One who keeps or uses explosives owes a duty, especially
to young children who cannot be expected to know and
appreciate the danger, to exercise care commensurate with
the danger to prevent injury to children who may have
access to or come in contact with the explosives.
The Supreme Court in Ohio proceeded further along the
path of safeguarding children from dangerous instrumentalities
by declaring in the case of Coy v. Columbus, Delaware and
Marion Electric Co.,41 that not only does the user of a dangerous
instrumentality have the duty to safeguard a dangerous force
such as an electrical transformer from pedestrians, especially
children, when they are known to frequent the premises, but,
further, that the duty commensurate with the danger requires
38 64 Ohio App. 446, 28 N.E. 2d 942 (1940).
a9 Ibid.
40 Vol. 22, pages 139 to 145 inclusive.
41 125 Ohio St. 283, 181 N.E. 31 (1932). In this case the defendant main-
tained a dangerous electrical transformer in close proximity to the street
and permitted the fence to fall into a state of disrepair so that persons
could enter. The court held: "When the static condition of premises is made
perilous by the active and negligent operation of apparatus thereon, by the
person owning or controlling the same, a liability arises for injury resulting
therefrom." Further, the court brought into sharp focus the question of
proximity and availability of such dangerous instrumentality wherein it
quoted from the case of Haywood v. Manufacturing Co., 142 Va. 761, 128
S.E. 362 (1925) as follows:
"We think the use of dangerous agencies and instrumentalities either in
the streets or so near thereto as to be easily reached by pedestrians
passing that way, places upon those responsible for the presence there
of the dangerous instrumentalities the duty of giving warnings to and
of safegarding the public by using such mechanical contrivances as will
effectually prevent injury to persons or property."
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the defendant to post danger signs and otherwise give sufficient
warning of peril.4 2
Injuries to Third Persons by Sale to a Minor
in Violation of Statute
Generally, in Ohio it is held that whoever does a wrongful
act is answerable for the ordinary consequences. In the case of
Poe v. Canton Mansfield Dry Goods Co.,43 the defendant un-
lawfully sold an air and shot gun to a thirteen year old boy in
violation of General Code 12966 (now Revised Code Sec.
2903.06) which set the minimum permissible age for such sales
at sixteen. The purchaser loaded the gun and permitted his
five year old brother to have it. He pointed it at the plaintiff,
discharged it, and caused him to lose an eye. The victim re-
covered from the seller even though there were several inter-
vening acts between the wrongful sale and the injury. The
court followed the ruling in the case of Schell v. Du Bois,
Admr.4 4 which held that the violation of a statute passed for
the protection of the public is negligence per se, and where such
act of negligence is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury
to which he did not directly contribute, the defendant is liable
to him for his injuries. The court stated that even if other acts
and circumstances intervened between the wrongful cause and
the injurious consequences, they do not bar recovery, especially
where they are acts of children of tender years, inexperienced
and imprudent.45 It was held that these intervening acts should
have been foreseen and that each act and result was to be con-
sidered a proximate result of the first wrongful act. The test
was determined to be the probable injurious consequences to be
anticipated from the first wrongful act, not in the number of
subsequent events and agencies which might arise. The court
concluded that upon such mixed questions of law and fact as
to probable cause, it was the function of the jury to determine
42 Id. at 290.
43 36 Ohio App. 395, 173 N.E. 318 (1929).
44 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664, A. L. R. 1917A, 710 (1916). Which concept,
that where a legislative enactment imposes upon any person a specific duty
for the protection of others, and his failure to perform that duty proxi-
mately causes injury to another, makes him liable as a matter of law for
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whether or not the alleged first wrongful act was a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. This theory is followed in the
case of Hawkins Downie Co. v. Holland,46 where a little six
year old boy found a cylindrical tin box under a rock near a
school where the defendant, a construction contractor, had used
blasting caps. The plaintiff and his companions curiously shook
the box and found it contained a metal substance which caused
it to rattle. They pounded the lid with a stone and finally re-
moved it. The box contained dynamite caps which they di-
vided, the plaintiff placing his treasure in his shirt pocket. That
evening, playing in front of his house, he jumped on the side-
walk, causing the dynamite cap to fly out of his pocket to the
sidewalk. The explosion caused him severe injuries for which
he sued and recovered. The same decision had been reached
earlier in the case of Baker v. Babitt47 where the defendant's
son sold cartridges to a fourteen year old, who gave them to a
teenager who hid them at home. The teenager's mother found
them and ordered him to return them to the donor but, instead,
he gave them to a twelve year old boy who in turn gave them to
two other boys who threw them in a bonfire around which some
boys were assembled. The explosion destroyed the minor plain-
tiff's eye. In upholding the recovery the court ruled that the
original wrong was selling to a fourteen year old boy, thus putting
in his hands an instrumentality which could injure him and
others, the original wrong continuing until the plaintiff was
injured.
Intentional Acts and Contributory Negligence
The issue of intentional acts being a bar to recovery of an
injury claim by a minor is raised in the case of Berchtold v.
Martin,48 involving a twelve year old who suffered an eye in-
jury from exploding blasting caps which the defendants claimed
were stolen from the office on their property and which the
plaintiff claimed were not secured as required by statute. A
unanimous verdict for the defendant was upheld by the Court
of Appeals, including instructions to the jury49 that:
46 16 Ohio L. Abs. 24 (1933).
47 2 Ohio L. Abs. 220 (1923).
48 38 Ohio App. 556, 177 N.E. 57 (1929).
49 Id. at 559, 560.
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1. The mere fact that the blasting caps were the property
of the defendant would not justify a verdict for plaintiff
unless it was also found that defendant failed to use
ordinary care in keeping and storing them.
2. The thirteen year old plaintiff was bound to use such
care and prudence as a boy of his age of ordinary care
and prudence would use under the same or similar cir-
cumstances and if he failed to follow this standard and
this was the proximate cause of his alleged injuries,
then a verdict for the defendant was required.
3. If the plaintiff purposely and voluntarily exploded the
blasting cap when he had sufficient maturity to know
that a dangerous explosion would probably result, then
he could not recover.
This ruling injected the issue of contributory negligence or
purposeful acts of the plaintiff minor in setting off explosives
as a bar to his recovery. The decision followed the second syl-
labus of the Schell v. DuBois, Admr. case5° with further ampli-
fication of the law in cases of wilful acts by minors.
Negligence Per Se
The year following the decision in the Berchtold case statutes
(Ohio Rev. Code Secs. 2903.05 and 2903.06) provided that who-
ever sells a toy pistol, airgun or any form of explosive gun to
a minor shall be liable in damages to any person injured by
such sale.
The case of Neff Lumber Co. v. Chervenko5 l involved a 16
year old minor who purchased a shotgun, which the defendants
unlawfully and negligently sold to him and which the minor
used to purposely kill one plaintiff and wound two others. In
holding that demurrers to the petition were properly overruled,
the court held that the natural and probable consequence of a
sale of a gun to a minor in violation of a penal statute would be
that the minor would shoot it, and that it was immaterial
whether the minor who bought the gun from the defendants in-
tentionally or negligently discharged it. The court stated:
unlimited in its scope, the statute evidently contemplates
any harmful use of the gun by a minor to whom the weapon
is unlawfully sold, whether accidental, negligent or inten-
tional, as being a natural and probable result of the illegal
50 Supra note 49.
51 122 Ohio St. 302, 171 N.E. 327 (1930).
Sept., 1966
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act and establishes liability for the doing of that unlawful
act.
52
This decision leaves the law in Ohio uncertain in situations
where the minor intentionally or negligently shoots himself, or
causes an explosion injuring himself, when the defendant sold
the gun, ammunition, explosive or fireworks to the minor.
Injuries to Third Persons by Stolen Explosives
In Graff v. Owens53 the petition stated that the plaintiff,
a minor age 19, was injured by the explosion of blasting caps
stolen from the defendant's premises and given to him a month
later by a fourteen year old boy. Plaintiff put them in his
pocket where they exploded. Plaintiff claimed that he did not
know or have the means of knowing that they were highly
explosive and dangerous, whereas the defendant knew of their
dangerous character and failed to keep them securely locked.
They were kept in a storage building for explosives next to a
quarry frequented by many children. The rule of liability was
not applied to this case because the plaintiff did not prove any
statutory violation by the defendant, and did not show where
plaintiff was when he received the stolen caps, nor where he
was when they exploded or how they exploded. Thus, the de-
murrer to the petition was ruled proper.
Conclusion
As is evident, the general rule in Ohio is that the in-
jurious consequences of a defendant's negligent use, sale or de-
livery of explosives and guns may be found to be the direct and
proximate cause of injuries, if according to human experience
and the natural course of events the defendant should have
known that the intervening act was likely to happen. The same
rule is applied in cases involving wrongful sales to minors
where the injured party is a third person, even where the in-
52 Id. at 310. This concept was later amplified in Mudrich v. Standard Oil
Co., 153 Ohio St. 31, 90 N.E. 2d 859 (1950), which involved injury to minors
by allowing spilled gasoline to lie unattended and subsequent burns to the
minors, wherein it states: "If an injury is the natural and probable conse-
quence of a negligent act and it is such as should have been foreseen in the
light of all attending circumstances, the injury is then the proximate result
of the negligence. It is not necessary that the defendant should have antici-
pated the particular injury. It is sufficient that this act is likely to result in
injury to someone."
53 16 Ohio L. Abs. 60 (1933).
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jury is wilfully inflicted. The question of whether a minor's
contributory negligence is a bar to his own recovery depends
on his age and experience and the circumstances of each case.
The cases where the defense of contributory negligence as a
bar to recovery is permitted seem to be in situations where pos-
session was not knowingly given by sale or gift. Decisions hold
that one who, contrary to the prohibition of the statutes, sells
guns or explosives to a minor is absolutely liable for the in-
juries caused to the purchaser or a third person. The prohibi-
tion on placing the condemned article on the market is for the
very purpose of preventing the opportunity for its purchase and
use, especially by minors, regardless of the knowledge of the
danger by the user. The sale of explosives, and fireworks in con-
travention of the statutes is an avaricious, criminal act done in
disregard of human safety and life. The original unlawful sale
is the initiating cause from which all other causes flow, tied in
natural proximate relation to each other. Contributory negli-
gence or wilful acts on the part of the purchaser or last pur-
chaser is immaterial to the civil liability of the seller. The crea-
tion of the opportunity to cause the injury is the source of the
evil. Only when this strict rule is inflexibly administered will
the likelihood of eliminating the menace be realized. It is the
very act of placing into the hands of young boys such danger-
ous substances or devices which triggers the tragic chain of
events. A boy is often subject to temptation which overcomes
his fear of the risk of injury. This is no less true if the boy
has used deceitful means to secure the product from the sup-
plier. The statutes contemplate that anyone younger than the
minimum statutory age, does not as a matter of law have the
knowledge, education, skill, mental capacity, judgment, ma-
turity and experience to properly understand the dangers of
using the prohibited item. That is the very reason the statute
is passed. It proclaims the public policy of the state to protect
minors from injury to themselves and others, by use of the
prohibited objects. This appears to be implied from the language
of the Ohio Revised Code Secs. 3743.02, 3743.32 and 3743.37.
The statutes do not contemplate the right to interpose de-
fenses to the civil liability of violators. It is only in the case
of articles stolen from properly guarded facilities that the rule
can or should be relaxed.
Sept., 1966
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